Each Clock Starts at Its Own Trigger
Updated
AdvancedWhat you'll learn
~20 min- Identify which trigger family starts a given reporting clock, rather than assuming detection starts all of them
- Record a determination as a dated, attributed decision entry, not as an incident state
- Explain why the clock calculator withholds an unsourced or pending row instead of guessing a deadline
What it is: a reporting-clock engine that starts each obligation from its own recorded trigger, not from the moment everyone happens to notice.
What it buys: a defensible answer to “did we miss a deadline,” traced to a dated decision and a named decider, not to memory.
What to fund: a named clock owner, separate from whoever is mitigating, and the discipline of recording a negative determination as carefully as a positive one.
In AI Assurance — a separate training in this series — the clock is one you set: the valid-through date on a decision you signed. This one someone else started. The applicable authority defines the binding party and trigger, and the applicable party records that trigger’s instant. It may be a determination, discovery, materiality decision, completed evaluation, awareness, payment, identification, or the event itself.
Before the detail — Artifact: the record’s determination entries, sourced from a calculator that refuses to run on a fact it cannot source. Status: binding where the cited regime applies; reusable guidance elsewhere.
Prompt first: draft the determination entry, not the deadline
Open your workspace agent, switch to Plan mode on your incident notes and reporting-obligation profile, and start with (if you do not have live exports or files handy, ask it to generate a small Meridian practice sample from the lesson’s scenario first):
Using our incident facts and counsel's reporting profile, draft one section 5 determination row for our reportability question. Quote only supplied facts, mark an undecided outcome NOT YET DECIDED, and compute no deadline before the trigger occurs.Check that the plan or draft covers:
- Locked trigger family: one of
determination,discovery,materiality,evaluation,awareness,payment,identification, orother. - Trigger instant and authorized decider: whether the trigger instant has actually happened yet (or
"not yet"), and who is authorized to decide (not merely who was paged). - Quoted facts and honest outcome: facts quoted directly from the supplied records, with the outcome set to
yes,no, orNOT YET DECIDED(never"probably no"). - No premature deadline: no deadline computed when the trigger instant is
"not yet".
If the first pass calculates a deadline from detection time instead of the trigger family’s instant, follow up with: "Remove any deadline calculated from detection time and leave the clock unstarted until the trigger instant occurs."
One event, several clocks, none of them starting where you’d guess
Three deadlines, two trigger instants: the one-hour and seven-day major-incident duties run from the agency’s determination; the 72-hour uncharacterized-event escalation runs from when the investigation opened. Detection starts none of them — miscounting which instant a clock shares is how a team finds a blown federal clock only in an audit.
Trigger families, not one clock
The calculator groups obligations by trigger family because the start instant is load-bearing; binding party, applicability, modality, recipient, and required content remain separate fields. The locked families are determination, discovery, materiality, evaluation, awareness, payment, and identification; an other row must name its own timestamp key.
- determination — FISMA (the federal major-incident reporting regime), per M-25-04’s footnote 42: the hour runs from determination, “not just the detection.”
fisma-major-cisa-1h(1 hour, CISA and OMB) andfisma-major-congress(7 days, Congress) share that determined_at instant; root cause is not required in the seven-day report. NERC CIP-008’s Reportable Cyber Security Incident clocks share this family. - discovery — DFARS 252.204-7012 (Defense contract clause, 72 hours, only if present) and HIPAA (health-privacy law, 60-day breach duty)
- materiality — the SEC’s Item 1.05 disclosure, from a determination about investors, not systems
- evaluation — a completed reportability evaluation under FedRAMP’s Incident Evaluation and Communication rules (adopted from RFC-0031 into the Consolidated Rules for 2026; required from 2026-07-04 for a provider obtaining a 20x certification, and from 2027-01-01 for one maintaining 20x or obtaining or maintaining Rev5), neither detection, determination, nor discovery
- awareness — the EU NIS2 early-warning row, shown only as published; does not apply to Meridian
- payment — the pending critical-infrastructure rule’s proposed ransom-payment clock, not in force
- identification — the California Public Utilities Commission’s outage-notification clock
Meridian can be compliant and late on one event: meeting a discovery-triggered clock does not meet a determination-triggered one on a different instant.
Here is the calculator’s own output table for a meter-data exposure scenario, regenerated verbatim:
$ python3 clocks/reporting_clocks.py --scenario meter-data --include-unverified --md
> **4 of 11 rows below are NOT verified.** They are printed because `--include-unverified` was passed. Their confidence is in the last column and their source entry in `sources.json` says why. Do not put an unverified row in front of a regulator, a customer, or a learner.
| Due (UTC) | Clock | Window | Trigger family | The authority's trigger | Modality | Owner | Recipient | Source | Confidence ||---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|| 2026-10-29T07:14:00Z | Electric emergency incident report (Normal Report) | 6 hours | `other` -> `occurred_at` | Normal Report criteria 10-13, due within 6 hours of the incident | must | system_operations_duty_manager | DOE | `doe-oe-417` Normal Report schedule, criteria 10-13 (criterion 12: loss of electric service to more than 50,000 customers for one hour or more) | verified || 2026-11-03T09:47:00Z | Major incident notification to CISA and OMB OFCIO | 1 hour | `determination` -> `determined_at` | notify CISA and the OMB Office of the Federal Chief Information Officer within one hour of the DETERMINATION that an incident is a major incident | must | agency_soc_duty_officer | CISA and OMB OFCIO | `omb-m-25-04` p.16, fn.42: the hour runs from the determination, 'not just the detection' | verified || 2026-11-03T09:47:00Z | Reportable cyber security incident (initial) | 1 hour | `determination` -> `determined_at` | One hour after the determination of a Reportable Cyber Security Incident | shall | compliance_duty_officer | E-ISAC and the CISA successor organisation | `nerc-cip-008-6` R4 Part 4.2 | verified || 2026-11-06T07:15:00Z | Uncharacterized event escalation to CISA | 72 hours | `other` -> `investigation_started_at` | events that have been under investigation for 72 hours without successful determination of the event's root cause or nature (i.e., malicious, suspicious, benign) | must | agency_soc_duty_officer | CISA | `omb-m-25-04` p.16 | verified || 2026-11-09T11:20:00Z | Material cybersecurity incident disclosure | 4 business days | `materiality` -> `materiality_at` | within four business days after the registrant determines that it has experienced a material cybersecurity incident | must | general_counsel | SEC (Form 8-K Item 1.05) | `sec-8k-item-105` 17 CFR 229.106; Form 8-K Item 1.05; Rel. 33-11216 | secondary || 2026-11-10T08:47:00Z | Major incident report to Congress | 7 days | `determination` -> `determined_at` | a reasonable basis to conclude that a major incident has occurred | must | agency_cio | named Congressional committees, OMB and the agency Inspector General | `omb-m-25-04` Reporting Major Incidents, pp.19-20; 44 U.S.C. 3554(b)(7)(C)(iii)(III) | verified || 2026-11-10T08:47:00Z | Reportable cyber security incident (supplement) | 7 days | `determination` -> `determined_at` | Provide updates, if any, within 7 calendar days of determination of new or changed attribute information required in Part 4.1 | shall | compliance_duty_officer | E-ISAC | `nerc-cip-008-6` R4 Part 4.3 | verified || 2026-12-03T07:25:00Z | State breach notification, example state A | 30 days | `discovery` -> `discovered_at` | as soon as practicable and not later than 30 days after discovery (stylised) | shall | privacy_officer | state attorney general | `tx-bus-com-521-053` modelled loosely on Tex. Bus. & Com. Code 521.053 as amended by SB 768 | secondary || 2026-12-18T07:25:00Z | State breach notification, example state B | 45 days | `discovery` -> `discovered_at` | within 45 days of discovery (stylised, mid-range) | shall | privacy_officer | state attorney general | `iapp-state-breach-chart` chart updated 2026-05-27; state clocks range roughly 30 to 90 days | secondary || **NOT IN EFFECT** | Covered cyber incident report | 72 hours | `other` -> `reasonable_belief_at` | reasonable belief that a covered cyber incident has occurred (proposed) | must | compliance_duty_officer | CISA | *(the pending critical-infrastructure rule's 2024 NPRM, RIN 1670-AA04 - named in 4.2)* | pending || **NOT STARTED** | CISA report (federal civilian agency incident) | 1 hour | `identification` -> `identification_at` | incident identified by the agency CSIRT, SOC or IT department | must | agency_soc_duty_officer | CISA Central | `cisa-fing` Federal Incident Notification Guidelines; duty incorporated by reference at OMB M-25-04 p.16 | unverified |The SEC row is secondary, shown only as published. The first row is a deliberate applicability challenge, not an overdue filing: it surfaces for any electric utility, while the real form needs criteria 10-13 the facts here do not establish — argue it off before treating its date as a duty. Two rows share 2026-11-10T08:47:00Z from one determined_at instant but answer different regimes; a shared deadline is not one obligation.
The determination entry: a decision, not a state
1.4’s record — one document, ten sections — stores a determination as a section-5 entry: criteria, instant, decider, evidence, outcome, source — never a status the incident passes through. A negative determination is load-bearing: it records the triggering condition was not met, so the clock never started; it does not stop one already running, and “we considered it and it did not apply” is a finding a regulator can read where silence is not.
The substrate’s worked example makes three such calls on one event, all negative, all dated, all made by someone not mitigating anything: reportable cyber security incident (no — no compromised system in scope), covered under the pending critical-infrastructure rule (not applicable, and not in force), material for the Securities and Exchange Commission (no — one workflow, a working fallback). Each names its trigger family, so a reviewer checks the entry against the calculator rather than a memory of the meeting.
The calculator refuses to guess
Verified and pending rows print by default; secondary and unverified rows require --include-unverified. An unresolved rule_source fails --lint; a pending row prints NOT IN EFFECT with no deadline, which the next lesson names. An unsourced deadline is a rumor with a number in it.
The test suite proves what one --detected timestamp could not: one event, discovery at 02:25 and determination 82 minutes later at 03:47, land on different deadlines, as they must. Move only the determination timestamp six hours later and the discovery-triggered deadline does not move, while the determination-triggered one shifts exactly six hours.
Stop and escalate when a trigger instant is MISSING or CONTESTED. Do not compute from a guess, and do not infer the legal trigger never occurred just because its timestamp is absent. The clock desk routes it to counsel or the named risk acceptor, who bounds risk from the earliest defensible instant until resolved.
An incident's discovery instant is recorded at 02:25. Three hours later, at 05:25, the general counsel formally determines it was a reportable cyber security incident. A clock keyed to the determination trigger family is now due in exactly the same number of hours as a clock keyed to the discovery trigger family, computed from 02:25. What does this tell you?
Key takeaway
A reporting clock starts at the instant its own authority names — determination, discovery, materiality, evaluation, awareness, identification, or a still-pending payment trigger — never at detection. A determination is a dated, attributed decision entry, not a state the incident passes through; a negative one is worth recording as carefully as a positive one. Next: which of these clocks reaches a vendor that is not an agency.
- LEADERSHIP DECISION
- name a clock owner, separate from whoever is mitigating, before the first page
- PRACTITIONER ACTION
- record every determination as a dated entry with trigger family, decider, evidence; run the calculator before drafting any notice
- SUCCESS MEASURE
- zero deadlines computed from a guessed or unsourced trigger - calendar time held